



Gobierno
de Chile



CULTURA DE AHORRO Y ECONOMÍA DEL COMPORTAMIENTO EN EL ÁMBITO PREVISIONAL

Seminario Internacional AIOS
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AGENDA

1. Motivation
2. Pension Projections: Online simulator
3. Experimental evaluation (product test) of a simplified version of the pension simulator
4. Pay-out phase implications
5. Final remarks



MOTIVATION

- ❑ **Adequacy without compromising the financial sustainability of the scheme.**
 - Several countries have chosen to move to a DC system.
 - DC require much more financial knowledge from its participants than DB.
- ❑ **Information and Education are relevant**
 - Can we improve pension savings by providing personalized information to participants on how to increase them?
- ❑ **Timing is important**
 - In Chile, where the pension system became a DC scheme in 1981, the first cohorts of affiliates are near to retire:
 - Low pension savings is a concern.

MOTIVATION

❑ **Financial knowledge is low**

- ❑ What is the contribution rate? 11% (EPS 2009)
- ❑ How is the total pension computed? 10% (EPS 2009)
- ❑ Which type of fund? 55% (FHS 2012)
- ❑ Actual amount in your personal saving account? 37% (FHS 2012)

❑ **Individual Behavior can be sub-optimal**

- ❑ No active involvement. Inertia.
- ❑ Decisions based on past performance.
- ❑ Funds changes with a short horizon view (Fuentes, Searle & Villatoro (2015))
- ❑ Poor planning of savings → Pension Outcomes negatively affected

❑ **Pension Expectations**

- ❑ Actual pension levels do not live up to the expectations of the population.
- ❑ Individuals desire/expect a pension closer to their actual/final salary.
- ❑ There is a gap between what is obtained and desired

PENSION SIMULATOR



❑ Pension Simulator to increase pension knowledge and awareness

- This is one of the main initiatives taken by the Superintendence
- It is publicly available at www.spensiones.cl
- It is a user friendly web tool that gives individuals a pension projection based on personal characteristics and administrative data.
- This was a project initiated in 2011 as a collaboration with the OECD
- Antolin & Fuentes (2012) OECD working paper
- High interest among users. More than 600,000 visits since it was launched in September of 2012. It has more than 15,000 average monthly visits.


❑ It is distinguished by:

- Bringing expectations of future pension, often unclear, to real numbers.
- Including the dimension of risk in the final result.
- Evaluating the effect of changing different parameters such as investment strategy, voluntary savings, retirement age.



PENSION SIMULATOR

Project stages



CHALLENGES FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED



- ❑ **Key issue for the regulator: How to deliver a simple but informative solution to users?**
 - Low degree of knowledge of pension concepts (differences according to educational level).
 - Knowledge of some concepts without association to the relevant technical language.
 - Difficulties to understand information about risk (e.g. confidence intervals).
 - Risk tend to be associated with negative outcomes (ignoring right tail)
 - Individuals do not evaluate how their history of contributions or lack of contributions affect their pension forecast.
 - Low degree of knowledge of measures that affiliates can take to have an effect on their pensions.
 - High interest in the existence of accessible (i.e. without much technical terms) help.
 - High interest in the possibility of obtaining information related to pension benefits.
 - The tool was designed taking the recommendations and comments of users obtained from focus groups and usability tests.

PENSION SIMULATOR

■ How the pension simulator works

- Users enter the [web tool](#) through a main page that welcome them to use the simulator.
- The pension risk simulator uses affiliates' characteristics as [inputs](#):
 - Gender and Age
 - Salary
 - Current pension savings balance (mandatory and voluntary)
 - Investment strategy
 - Expected salary and beneficiaries

■ Main outcomes

- The expected pension at retirement and the risk associated to this [forecast](#)

■ How to improve the expected pension

- The users receives information regarding measures they can take to improve their forecast: postpone retirement, increase voluntary savings, contribute more, choose a different investment path.



❑ Pension Simulator Experimental Evaluation

- A product test grant by the Global Financial Inclusion Initiative-IPA was awarded to the SP and J-Pal.
- Randomized Control Trial: Personalizing Information to Improve Retirement Savings
- Project Timeline: 2014-2016
- Goal: to measure the impact of offering personalized information about pensions on long-term savings and employment decisions.



EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION


❑ Implementation to reach the target population

- We built 8 self-service modules and installed them in the offices of “Chile Atiende”
- A government office which centralizes all the interactions that citizens may have with the government, including payments of social benefits.
- We anticipated that this would allow us to reach a poorer population than the online version of the simulator. This is the case.

❑ Randomization

- Randomly assigned participants (by their national ID number) to having access to their:
 - Personalized simulation (treatment group) or to some generic pension advice (control group).
- Then using administrative records, we can follow the behavior of individuals and see the impact on decisions to have been treated.

EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION



EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION: PRELIMINARY RESULTS

❑ **The experimental evaluation indicates that**

- The simulator seems to provide new valuable information to the participants.
- Many individuals strongly overestimate or underestimate their pension prospects
- Suggests the need to interact our treatment effect by what type of “news” is provided to the participants.
- In the aggregate, voluntary contributions increase. Average effect suggests that there is increased savings into the pension funds.

❑ **Closing the gap**

- The positive effect is driven by those who expected a higher pension than the one simulated.

❑ **Scaling-up the project**

- It would face some challenges as take-up is low without a human helper, which is a useful result by itself.
- Permanent change in behavior versus transitory

IMPLICATIONS FROM BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS



- ❑ **Participants need to have the right information in advance**
 - To take decisions on savings to improve their pension outcomes.
 - A Pension simulator or other type of personalized information can be very useful on this.
- ❑ **Default Mechanisms are part of the solution**
 - Default Investment strategy
 - Default provider
- ❑ **Retirement age is a key variable participants need to choose.**
 - Legal retirement age in the case of Chile is a minimum requirement.
 - For early retirement participants need to fulfill some conditions.
- ❑ **SCOMP has improved the decision making in the pay-out phase**
 - Eliminating information asymmetries between participants and providers
 - Information and pricing on all pension products available



FINAL REMARKS

- ❑ The regulator in the case of Chile is actively involved in providing more and better information to members, including initiatives in financial education.
- ❑ Continue the efforts to increase financial education and awareness
- ❑ Communicate the long term perspective of pension savings
- ❑ Improve the necessary information and tools available in order to promote active participation and affiliates wellbeing during retirement
- ❑ Financial education is one of the main strategic goals for the Superintendence of Pensions.



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